| Chicago Board of Trade v. United States | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued December 18–19, 1917 Decided March 4, 1918 | |
| Full case name | Chicago Board of Trade v. United States |
| Citations | 246 U.S. 231 (more) 38 S. Ct. 242; 62 L. Ed. 683; 1918 U.S. LEXIS 1538 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | On writ of certiorari to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois |
| Holding | |
| The "call rule" of the Chicago Board of Trade was ultimately procompetitive, and did not violate the Sherman Act. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinion | |
| Majority | Brandeis, joined by unanimous |
| McReynolds took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
| Laws applied | |
| Sherman Antitrust Act | |
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States applied the "rule of reason" to the internal trading rules of a commodity market. Section 1 of the Sherman Act flatly states: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."[1] However, in evaluating the U.S. government's allegations that the Chicago Board of Trade's rules on grain prices violated the Act, the Supreme Court rejected a strict interpretation of its language: "The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."
- ^ Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, § 1 (excerpt).