Civil control of the military

Secretary of the Air Force Verne Orr with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones and Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew Allen and Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General Robert C. Mathis at a ceremony in Bolling Air Force Base in 1982. In this capacity the Secretary of the Air Force serves as the civilian head of the Department of the Air Force which includes the U.S. Air Force and Space Force. As the civilian head, the Secretary of the Air Force also oversees most of the Department of the Air Force operational and day-to-day activities. The service chiefs which include the Air Force Chief of Staff and Chief of Space Operations also report directly to the Secretary of the Air Force, but not the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be a four-star general from either the Air Force or the Space Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States, due to their status as the highest-ranking and most senior military officer in the United States Armed Forces.
Admiral John B. Nathman (far right) and Admiral William J. Fallon salute during honors arrival of Secretary of the Navy Gordon R. England at a change of command ceremony in 2005. A subordinate of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy is the civilian head of the Department of the Navy, which includes the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps.

Civil control of the military is a doctrine in military and political science that places ultimate responsibility for a country's strategic decision-making in the hands of the state's civil authority, rather than completely with professional military leadership itself. As such, a "fundamental requirement of any nation is to ensure that the activities of its armed forces are subordinated to the political purposes of constitutional government; hence, the armed forces must be under civil control".[1] The concept of civil control falls within the overarching concept of civil-military relations representing the "societal imperative that the military remain subordinate to civil authority and that it reflect, to an appropriate degree, societal values and norms".[2]

Civil oversight over militaries puts the power to take military action in the hands of a civil authority, such as through government ministers or legislative bodies, or the democratic apparatus of the Crown in constitutional monarchies. Allowing the civil component of government to retain control over the military or state security illustrates the power of the citizenry, a healthy respect for democratic values, and what can be described as good governance.[3] Giving power to the civil component of the government over what the military can do and how much money it can spend protects the democratic process from abuse. Nations that can achieve legitimate relationship between the two structures serve to be more effective and provide accountability between government and military.[4]

Civil control can be accomplished in a number of ways, for example through complete civilian control or for a mixed civilian-military approach, for example, "typical for the British model of armed forces administration is the balanced ratio of civilian and military personnel in key ministerial positions".[5] Under the civil control model, a state's government and military are confined to the rule of law and submit to civil oversight to make an effective security apparatus possible.[4] Transparency has taken hold throughout the international system to improve bureaucracy and the democratisation of both democratic countries and resistant authoritarian holdovers. This has grown to involve the armed forces/security forces themselves to work towards the international norm of fully liberalising these organisations.[6]

Civil control is often seen as a prerequisite feature of a stable liberal democracy. Use of the term in scholarly analyses tends to take place in the context of a democracy governed by elected officials, though the subordination of the military to political control is not unique to these societies. For example, there is often civilian control of the military in communist states, such as the People's Republic of China. Mao Zedong stated that "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party," reflecting the primacy of the Chinese Communist Party over the People's Liberation Army.

As noted by University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill professor Richard H. Kohn, "civilian control is not a fact but a process".[7] Affirmations of respect for the values of civil control notwithstanding, the actual level of control sought or achieved by the civil leadership may vary greatly in practice, from a statement of broad policy goals that military commanders are expected to translate into operational plans, to the direct selection of specific targets for attack on the part of governing politicians. National leaders with limited experience in military matters often have little choice but to rely on the advice of professional military commanders trained in the art and science of warfare to inform the limits of policy; in such cases, the military establishment may enter the bureaucratic arena to advocate for or against a particular course of action, shaping the policy-making process and blurring any clear cut lines of civil control.

The reverse situation, where professional military officers control national politics, is called a military dictatorship.

A lack of control over the military may result in a state within a state, as observed in countries like Pakistan. One author, paraphrasing Samuel P. Huntington's writings in The Soldier and the State, has summarised the civil control ideal as "the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by civilian authority".[8]

  1. ^ Graham, Ross (2002). "Civil Control of the Canadian Forces: National Direction and National Command" (PDF). Canadian Military Journal. 3 (1): 23–30.
  2. ^ Government of Canada (2019). "The Organization and Functioning of the Profession of Arms in Canada". Retrieved 2024-03-18.
  3. ^ Brinkerhoff, Derick W.; Johnson, Ronald W.; Hill, Richard (2009). Merrill, Susan (ed.). "CIVILIAN CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT". Guide to Rebuilding Governance in Stability Operations: A Role for the Military?. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): 49–53. JSTOR resrep12059.18.
  4. ^ a b Friend, Alice Hunt (2020). "Civilian Protection through Civilian Control: An Overlooked Piece of Security Sector Assistance in the Sahel". Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): 1–6. JSTOR resrep27644.
  5. ^ NATO (1997). "Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Share of the Civilians in the Management of the Department of Defence, including their Preparation for the Exercising of their Functions in Stabilised Democratic States in Europe" (PDF). Retrieved 2024-03-18.
  6. ^ Kümmel, Gerhard (2002). "The Military and its Civilian Environment: Reflections on a Theory of Civil-Military Relations". Connections. 1 (4): 63–82. doi:10.11610/Connections.01.4.06. ISSN 1812-1098. JSTOR 26322967.
  7. ^ Kohn, Richard H. (1997). "An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military". American Diplomacy.
  8. ^ Taylor, Edward R. (1998). Command in the 21st Century: An Introduction to Civil-Military Affairs (United States Navy Postgraduate School thesis). Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School. pp. 30–32. hdl:10945/32705. Archived from the original (pdf) on April 8, 2013.

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