Double-aspect theory

In the philosophy of mind, double-aspect theory is the view that the mental and the physical are two aspects of, or perspectives on, the same substance. It is also called dual-aspect monism, not to be confused with mind–body dualism.[1] The theory's relationship to neutral monism is ill-defined,

Neutral monism and the dual-aspect theory share a central claim: there is an underlying reality that is neither mental nor physical. But that is where the agreement stops. Neutral monism has no room for the central feature of the dual-aspect theory: the mental and physical aspects, sides, or properties that characterize the underlying entities of dual-aspect theory. The neutral monist accepts the mental/physical distinction.

[2]

According to Harald Atmanspacher, "dual-aspect approaches consider the mental and physical domains of reality as aspects, or manifestations, of an underlying undivided reality in which the mental and the physical do not exist as separate domains. In such a framework, the distinction between mind and matter results from an epistemic split that separates the aspects of the underlying reality. Consequently, the status of the psychophysically neutral domain is considered as ontic relative to the mind–matter distinction".[3]

Dual-aspect theory is akin to neutral monism. This diagram contrasts it with physicalism and idealism, as well as Cartesian dualism.
  1. ^ Harald Atmanspacher; Christopher A. Fuchs (23 June 2014). The Pauli-Jung Conjecture and Its Impact Today. Andrews UK Limited. p. 182. ISBN 978-1-84540-759-9.
  2. ^ Leopold Stubenberg. "Neutral Monism and the Dual Aspect Theory". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  3. ^ Atmanspacher, Harald. The Pauli–Jung Conjecture and Its Relatives: A Formally Augmented Outline. Open Philosophy, Volume 3 Issue 1. De Gruyter | Published online: September 11, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0138.

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