Greek Civil War

Greek Civil War
	Part of the Cold War
	; QF 25 pounder gun of the Hellenic Army during the Civil War
Date	31 March 1946 – 30 August 1949; (3 years, 6 months, 2 weeks and 2 days)
Location	Greece (with spillover into Albania)
Result	Governmental victory
Belligerents
Kingdom of Greece Hellenic Army; Royal Hellenic Air Force (minor participation); Royal Hellenic Navy (limited participation in support); Royal Gendarmerie; MAY (1946–1948); TEA (1948–1949); Supported by: United Kingdom (1944–1947); United States (1946–1949)	Provisional Democratic Government (from 1947) Democratic Army (from December 1946); Communist Party of Greece and allies Ex-EAM members and other communist guerrillas' local groups (March 1946 – December 1946); People's Civil Guard; ; Supported by: Yugoslavia (1946–1948); Bulgaria; Albania; Soviet Union (limited)
Commanders and leaders
King Paul; Alexandros Papagos; Themistoklis Sofoulis; Konstantinos Ventiris; Thrasyvoulos Tsakalotos; Dimitrios Giatzis; James Van Fleet; Ronald Scobie;	Nikolaos Zachariadis; Markos Vafiadis; Kostas Karagiorgis;
Strength
232,500 (at peak);	26,000 (at peak, mid-1948); Total: c. 100,000 men and women served, of whom:; 15,000–20,000 ; Slav Macedonians; 2,000–3,000 Pomaks; 130–150 Chams
Casualties and losses
Hellenic Army, Navy and Air Force, from 16 August 1945 to 22 December 1951: 15,268 killed, 37,255 wounded, 3,843 missing, 865 deserters; Hellenic Gendarmerie, from 1 December 1944 to 27 December 1951: 1,485 killed, 3,143 wounded, 159 missing;	38,839 killed; 20,128 captured; (Hellenic Army claim);
	80,000–158,000 total killed; 1,000,000 temporarily relocated during the war

The Greek Civil War (Greek: Eμφύλιος Πόλεμος, romanized: Emfýlios Pólemos) took place from 1946 to 1949. The conflict, which erupted shortly after the end of World War II, consisted of a Communist-led uprising against the established government of the Kingdom of Greece. The rebels declared a people's republic, the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece, which was governed by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and its military branch, the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE). The rebels were supported by Albania and Yugoslavia. With the support of the United Kingdom and the United States, the Greek government forces ultimately prevailed.

The war had its roots in divisions within Greece during World War II between the Communist-dominated left-wing resistance organisation, the EAM-ELAS, and loosely-allied anti-communist resistance forces. It later escalated into a major civil war between the Greek state and the Communists. The DSE was defeated by the Hellenic Army.^[12]

The war resulted from a highly polarized struggle between left and right ideologies that started when each side targeted the power vacuum resulting from the end of Axis occupation (1941–1944) during World War II. The struggle was the first proxy conflict of the Cold War and represents the first example of postwar involvement on the part of the Allies in the internal affairs of a foreign country,^[13] an implementation of the containment policy suggested by US diplomat George F. Kennan in his Long Telegram of February 1946.^[14] The Greek royal government in the end was funded by the United States (through the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Marshall Plan of 1948) and joined NATO (1952), while the insurgents were demoralized by the bitter split between the Soviet Union's Joseph Stalin, who wanted to end the war, and Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito, who wanted it to continue.^[15]

^ The Struggle for Greece 1941–1949, C. M.Woodhouse, Hurst & Company, London 2002 (first published 1976), p. 237
^ Νίκος Μαραντζίδης, Δημοκρατικός Στρατός Ελλάδας, 1946–1949, Εκδόσεις Αλεξάνδρεια, β'έκδοση, Αθήνα 2010, p. 52
^ Νίκος Μαραντζίδης, Δημοκρατικός Στρατός Ελλάδας, (Kayluff a hoe)1946–1949, Εκδόσεις Αλεξάνδρεια, β'έκδοση, Αθήνα 2010, pp. 52, 57, 61–62
^ Γενικόν Επιτελείον Στρατού, Διεύθυνσις Ηθικής Αγωγής, Η Μάχη του Έθνους, Ελεύθερη Σκέψις, Athens, 1985, pp. 35–36
^ Γενικόν Επιτελείον Στρατού, p. 36
^ Keridis 2022, p. 54.
^ Howard Jones, A New Kind of War (1989)^{[page needed]}
^ Edgar O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War: 1944–1949 (1966)^{[page needed]}
^ T. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule (1996)^{[page needed]}
^ "B&J": Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management 1945–1995 (1997)^{[page needed]}
^ Γιώργος Μαργαρίτης, Η ιστορία του Ελληνικού εμφυλίου πολέμου ISBN 960-8087-12-0^{[page needed]}
^ Nikos Marantzidis and Giorgos Antoniou. "The Axis Occupation and Civil War: Changing trends in Greek historiography, 1941–2002." Journal of Peace Research (2004) 41#2 pp: 223–231.
^ Chomsky, Noam (1994). World Orders, Old And New. Pluto Press London.
^ Iatrides, John O. (2005). "George F. Kennan and the Birth of Containment: The Greek Test Case". World Policy Journal. 22 (3): 126–145. doi:10.1215/07402775-2005-4005. ISSN 0740-2775.
^ Robert Service summarizes Soviet vacillations: Service, Robert (2007). "22. Western Europe". Comrades!: A History of World Communism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 266–268. ISBN 9780674025301. Retrieved 2016-10-28. After the German forces withdrew in October 1944, the Greek Communist Party found its armed force – ELAS – subordinated to the British army with Moscow's consent. But the Greek Communist Party soon opted for insurgency. Clashes occurred between the communists and the British, together with the forces of the new British-backed Greek government. Stalin at the time, however, needed to maintain good relations with the United Kingdom for strategic reasons [...] Without outside help, [...] the revolt petered out. Then Stalin changed his mind, hoping to play off the Americans and British over Greece. [...] By 1946 [the Greek Communists] were eager to resume armed struggle. [...] Zachariadis [...] needed support from Communist states for military equipment, and he gained the desired consent on his trips to Belgrade, Prague and Moscow. [...] But Stalin changed his mind yet again and advised emphasis on political measures rather than the armed struggle. [...] Tito and the Yugoslavs, however, continued to render material assistance and advice to the Greek communists. [...] Stalin reverted to a militant stance after the announcement [1947] of the Marshall Plan and ceased trying to restrain the Greek Communist Party. Soviet military equipment was covertly rushed to Greece. A provisional revolutionary government was proclaimed [24 December 1947]. But it became clear that the Greek Communists as well as their Yugoslav sympathisers had exaggerated their strength and potential. Stalin felt he had been misled, and called for an end to the uprising in Greece. [...] The Yugoslav Communists objected to Stalin's change of policy. [...] Bulgarian Communist leader Traicho Kostov urged that Soviet aid be sent to the Greek insurrectionists. [...] This had disastrous consequences for the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship; it also brought doom to Kostov, who was executed [16 December 1949] with Stalin's connivance at the end of 1948. Stalin himself continued to waffle on the Greek question in the following months [...] but in the end he ordered the communists under Nikos Zachariadis and Markos Vafiadis to end the civil war. [...] Yet, despite being deprived of supplies from Moscow, they refused to stop fighting royalist forces. [...] Ultimately the Communist insurgency stood no chance of succeeding. By the end of 1949 the Communist revolt had been crushed and the remnant of the anti-government forces fled to Albania.

[1] The Struggle for Greece 1941–1949, C. M.Woodhouse, Hurst & Company, London 2002 (first published 1976), p. 237

[2] Νίκος Μαραντζίδης, Δημοκρατικός Στρατός Ελλάδας, 1946–1949, Εκδόσεις Αλεξάνδρεια, β'έκδοση, Αθήνα 2010, p. 52

[3] Νίκος Μαραντζίδης, Δημοκρατικός Στρατός Ελλάδας, (Kayluff a hoe)1946–1949, Εκδόσεις Αλεξάνδρεια, β'έκδοση, Αθήνα 2010, pp. 52, 57, 61–62

[4] Γενικόν Επιτελείον Στρατού, Διεύθυνσις Ηθικής Αγωγής, Η Μάχη του Έθνους, Ελεύθερη Σκέψις, Athens, 1985, pp. 35–36

[5] Γενικόν Επιτελείον Στρατού, p. 36

[FOOTNOTEKeridis202254-6] Keridis 2022, p. 54.

[7] Howard Jones, A New Kind of War (1989)^{[page needed]}

[8] Edgar O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War: 1944–1949 (1966)^{[page needed]}

[9] T. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule (1996)^{[page needed]}

[10] "B&J": Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management 1945–1995 (1997)^{[page needed]}

[Margaritis-11] Γιώργος Μαργαρίτης, Η ιστορία του Ελληνικού εμφυλίου πολέμου ISBN 960-8087-12-0^{[page needed]}

[12] Nikos Marantzidis and Giorgos Antoniou. "The Axis Occupation and Civil War: Changing trends in Greek historiography, 1941–2002." Journal of Peace Research (2004) 41#2 pp: 223–231.

[Noam&Chomsky-13] Chomsky, Noam (1994). World Orders, Old And New. Pluto Press London.

[14] Iatrides, John O. (2005). "George F. Kennan and the Birth of Containment: The Greek Test Case". World Policy Journal. 22 (3): 126–145. doi:10.1215/07402775-2005-4005. ISSN 0740-2775.

[Robert_Service_2007_pp_266-68-15] Robert Service summarizes Soviet vacillations: Service, Robert (2007). "22. Western Europe". Comrades!: A History of World Communism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 266–268. ISBN 9780674025301. Retrieved 2016-10-28. After the German forces withdrew in October 1944, the Greek Communist Party found its armed force – ELAS – subordinated to the British army with Moscow's consent. But the Greek Communist Party soon opted for insurgency. Clashes occurred between the communists and the British, together with the forces of the new British-backed Greek government. Stalin at the time, however, needed to maintain good relations with the United Kingdom for strategic reasons [...] Without outside help, [...] the revolt petered out. Then Stalin changed his mind, hoping to play off the Americans and British over Greece. [...] By 1946 [the Greek Communists] were eager to resume armed struggle. [...] Zachariadis [...] needed support from Communist states for military equipment, and he gained the desired consent on his trips to Belgrade, Prague and Moscow. [...] But Stalin changed his mind yet again and advised emphasis on political measures rather than the armed struggle. [...] Tito and the Yugoslavs, however, continued to render material assistance and advice to the Greek communists. [...] Stalin reverted to a militant stance after the announcement [1947] of the Marshall Plan and ceased trying to restrain the Greek Communist Party. Soviet military equipment was covertly rushed to Greece. A provisional revolutionary government was proclaimed [24 December 1947]. But it became clear that the Greek Communists as well as their Yugoslav sympathisers had exaggerated their strength and potential. Stalin felt he had been misled, and called for an end to the uprising in Greece. [...] The Yugoslav Communists objected to Stalin's change of policy. [...] Bulgarian Communist leader Traicho Kostov urged that Soviet aid be sent to the Greek insurrectionists. [...] This had disastrous consequences for the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship; it also brought doom to Kostov, who was executed [16 December 1949] with Stalin's connivance at the end of 1948. Stalin himself continued to waffle on the Greek question in the following months [...] but in the end he ordered the communists under Nikos Zachariadis and Markos Vafiadis to end the civil war. [...] Yet, despite being deprived of supplies from Moscow, they refused to stop fighting royalist forces. [...] Ultimately the Communist insurgency stood no chance of succeeding. By the end of 1949 the Communist revolt had been crushed and the remnant of the anti-government forces fled to Albania.

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