Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton | |
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Argued March 20, 1989 Decided June 22, 1989 | |
Full case name | Harte-Hanks Communications, Incorporated v. Daniel Connaughton |
Citations | 491 U.S. 657 (more) 109 S. Ct. 2678; 105 L. Ed. 2d 562; 1989 U.S. LEXIS 3133 |
Case history | |
Prior | Motion to dismiss denied, (S.D. Ohio.); judgment for plaintiff, S.D. Ohio.; judgment set aside, judgment for defendant (S.D. Ohio 1984); affirmed, 842 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1988); rehearing denied, 6th Circuit; cert. granted, 488 U.S. 907 (1988). |
Holding | |
Ignoring obvious sources and reporting with a reckless disregard for the truth are sufficient evidence for actual malice in libel law. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor, Kennedy |
Concurrence | White, joined by Rehnquist |
Concurrence | Blackmun |
Concurrence | Kennedy |
Concurrence | Scalia (in the judgment) |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. I |
Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States supplied an additional journalistic behavior that constitutes actual malice as first discussed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964).[1] In the case, the Court held that departure from responsible reporting and unreasonable reporting conduct alone were not sufficient to award a public figure damages in a libel case. However, the Court also ruled that if reporters wrote with reckless disregard for the truth, which included ignoring obvious sources for their report, plaintiffs could be awarded compensatory damages on the grounds of actual malice.[2]