^"Fichte in Berlin to Schelling in Jena, May 31–August 7[8?], 1801," in: Michael Vater and David W. Wood (eds. and trs.), The Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling: Selected Texts and Correspondence (1800-1802), SUNY Press, 2012, p. 56.
^ ab"Review of Aenesidemus" ("Rezension des Aenesidemus", Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 11–12 February 1794). Trans. Daniel Breazeale. In Breazeale, Daniel; Fichte, Johann (1993). Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings. Cornell University Press. p. 63. (See also: FTP, p. 46; Breazeale 1980–81, pp. 545–68; Breazeale and Rockmore 1994, p. 19; Breazeale 2013, pp. 36–37; Waibel, Breazeale, Rockmore 2010, p. 157: "Fichte believes that the I must be grasped as the unity of synthesis and analysis.")
^Grundlage der gesamten[sic] Wissenschaftslehre, 1794/1795, p. 274.
^Gesamtausgabe I/2: 364–65; Daniel Breazeale, "Fichte's Conception of Philosophy as a "Pragmatic History of the Human Mind" and the Contributions of Kant, Platner, and Maimon," Journal of the History of Ideas, 62(4), Oct. 2001, pp. 685–703; Zöller 1998, p. 130 n. 30; Sedgwick 2007, p. 144 n. 33; Breazeale and Rockmore 2010, p. 50 n. 27: "Α »history of the human mind« is a genetic account of the self-constitution of the I in the form of an ordered description of the various acts of thinking that are presupposed by the act of thinking the I"; Posesorski 2012, p. 81: "Pragmatische Geschichte des menschlichen Geistes designates reason's timeless course of production of the different levels of the a priori system of all knowledge, which are exclusively uncovered and portrayed genetically by personal self-conscious reflection"; Breazeale 2013, p. 72.
^The principle of reciprocal determination (der Satz der Wechselbestimmbarkeit) is the principle that, according to Fichte (Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, "Halle Nachschrift," 1796/1797), explicitly guides all philosophical reflection; it is derived from the reciprocally determinable relationship between the finite I and its other. In a similar way, Fichte had derived in his Foundations of the Science of Knowledge (publ. 1794/1795, paras. 1–2) the logical laws of identity and non-contradiction from the original positing and counter-positing of the I. (See Breazeale 2013, pp. 54–5.)
^Gesamtausgabe II/3: 24–25; Breazeale 2013, p. 198.
^Fichte, J. G., "Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre" ("Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre"; 1797); Rocío Zambrana, Hegel's Theory of Intelligibility, University of Chicago Press, 2015, p. 151 n. 15.
^FTP, p. 365; Waibel, Breazeale, Rockmore 2010, p. 157; Breazeale 2013, pp. 354 and 404–439.