Philosophical conception of meaning
This article is about the philosophical treatment of meaning. For the linguistic treatment of meaning, see
Semantics . For the non-linguistic treatment of meaning, see
Meaning (non-linguistic) . For other uses, see
Meaning .
In philosophy —more specifically, in its sub-fields semantics , semiotics , philosophy of language , metaphysics , and metasemantics —meaning "is a relationship between two sorts of things: signs and the kinds of things they intend, express, or signify".[ 1]
The types of meanings vary according to the types of the thing that is being represented. There are:
the things, which might have meaning;
things that are also signs of other things, and therefore are always meaningful (i.e., natural signs of the physical world and ideas within the mind);
things that are necessarily meaningful, such as words and nonverbal symbols.
The major contemporary positions of meaning come under the following partial definitions of meaning:
psychological theories, involving notions of thought , intention , or understanding ;
logical theories, involving notions such as intension , cognitive content, or sense , along with extension , reference , or denotation;
message, content, information , or communication ;
truth conditions ;
usage, and the instructions for usage;
measurement , computation, or operation.
^ Richard E Morehouse, Beginning Interpretive Inquiry , Routledge, 2012, p. 32.