Back شكوكية أخلاقية Arabic Irrtumstheorie German Escepticismo moral Spanish شکگرایی اخلاقی Persian Scepticisme moral French ספקנות מוסרית HE 懐疑主義 (倫理) Japanese Moreel scepticisme Dutch Ceticismo moral Portuguese Värdeskepticism Swedish
Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism in British English) is a class of meta-ethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible. Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism: the view that there are knowable and objective moral truths.
Some defenders of moral skepticism include Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, Sextus Empiricus, David Hume, J. L. Mackie (1977), Friedrich Nietzsche, Richard Joyce (2001), Joshua Greene, Richard Garner, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006b), and the philosopher James Flynn. Strictly speaking, Gilbert Harman (1975) argues in favor of a kind of moral relativism, not moral skepticism. However, he has influenced some contemporary moral skeptics.