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Political polarization

For the social psychology concept, see Group polarization.

Political polarization is the divergence of political attitudes away from the center, towards ideological extremes.[1][2][3] Scholars distinguish between ideological polarization (differences in policy positions) and affective polarization (an emotional dislike and distrust of political out-groups).[4]

Political polarization is closely-related to the center squeeze effect studied in social choice, a pro-extremist bias common to partisan primaries, nonpartisan primaries, and ranked-choice voting (RCV), which incentivize candidates to adopt extreme positions to shore up support among their political base.[5][6][7][8]

  1. ^ DiMaggio, Paul; Evans, John; Bryson, Bethany (1 November 1996). "Have American's Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?" (PDF). American Journal of Sociology. 102 (3): 690–755. doi:10.1086/230995. S2CID 144020785. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 22 April 2013.
  2. ^ Baldassarri, Delia; Gelman, Andrew (1 September 2008). "Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion". American Journal of Sociology. 114 (2): 408–446. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.69.255. doi:10.1086/590649. S2CID 222436264.
  3. ^ Fiorina, Morris P.; Abrams, Samuel J. (1 June 2008). "Political Polarization in the American Public". Annual Review of Political Science. 11 (1): 563–588. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.153836.
  4. ^ Iyengar, Shanto; Lelkes, Yphtach; Levendusky, Matthew; Malhotra, Neil; Westwood, Sean J. (2019). "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States". Annual Review of Political Science. 22 (1): 129–146. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034. ISSN 1094-2939. S2CID 102523958.
  5. ^ Robinette, Robbie (2023-09-01). "Implications of strategic position choices by candidates". Constitutional Political Economy. 34 (3): 445–457. doi:10.1007/s10602-022-09378-6. ISSN 1572-9966.
  6. ^ Ogren, Marcus (2024-08-01). "Candidate incentive distributions: How voting methods shape electoral incentives". Electoral Studies. 90: 102799. arXiv:2306.07147. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102799. ISSN 0261-3794.
  7. ^ McGann, Anthony J.; Koetzle, William; Grofman, Bernard (2002). "How an Ideologically Concentrated Minority Can Trump a Dispersed Majority: Nonmedian Voter Results for Plurality, Run-off, and Sequential Elimination Elections". American Journal of Political Science. 46 (1): 134–147. doi:10.2307/3088418. ISSN 0092-5853. JSTOR 3088418.
  8. ^ Merrill, Samuel (1985). "A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions". Public Choice. 47 (2): 389–403. doi:10.1007/bf00127534. ISSN 0048-5829. the 'squeeze effect' that tends to reduce Condorcet efficiency if the relative dispersion (RD) of candidates is low. This effect is particularly strong for the plurality, runoff, and Hare systems, for which the garnering of first-place votes in a large field is essential to winning

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