| Judicial interpretation |
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| General rules of interpretation |
| General theories of interpretation |
The purposive approach (sometimes referred to as purposivism,[1] purposive construction,[2] purposive interpretation,[3] or the modern principle in construction)[4] is an approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation under which common law courts interpret an enactment (a statute, part of a statute, or a clause of a constitution) within the context of the law's purpose.
Purposive interpretation is a derivation of mischief rule set in Heydon's Case,[5] and intended to replace the mischief rule, the plain meaning rule and the golden rule.[6] Purposive interpretation is used when the courts use extraneous materials from the pre-enactment phase of legislation, including early drafts, hansards, committee reports, and white papers.
Israeli jurist Aharon Barak views purposive interpretation as a legal construction that combines subjective and objective elements.[7] Barak states that the subjective elements include the intention of the author of the text, whereas the objective elements include the intent of the reasonable author and the legal system's fundamental values.[7]
Critics of purposivism argue it fails to separate the powers between the legislator and the judiciary,[8] as it allows more freedom in interpretation by way of extraneous materials in interpreting the law.
- ^ Posner, Richard. Pragmatism versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis. Stanford Law Review Vol. 54, No. 4, Apr., 2002, pp. 737–7520
- ^ Bourchard, Ron A. Living Separate and Apart is Never Easy: Inventive Capacity of the PHOSITA as the Tie that Binds Obviousness and Inventiveness in Pharmaceutical Litigation. University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal, January 2007 (Canada)
- ^ Barak, Aharon. Purposive Interpretation In Law. Princeton University Press. (Princeton, New Jersey), 2005
- ^ Driedger, E.A. Construction of Statutes. Butterworth & Co. (Canada) 2d ed., 1983, p. 83
- ^ Bennion, F.A.R. Statutory Interpretation. Butterworth & Co. (London) 3d ed., 1997, pp. 731–750
- ^ Driedger, E.A. Construction of Statutes. Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd., 1983, p. 87
- ^ a b Barak, Aharon. Purposive Interpretation In Law. Princeton University Press (New Jersey), 2005, p. 88
- ^ Amy E. Fahey, Note, United States v. O'Hagan: The Supreme Court Abandons Textualism to Adopt the Misappropriation Theory, 25 Fordham Urb. L.J. 507, 534 (1998).