Security dilemma

In international relations, the security dilemma (also referred to as the spiral model) is when the increase in one state's security (such as increasing its military strength) leads other states to fear for their own security (because they do not know if the security-increasing state intends to use its growing military for offensive purposes).[1][2] Consequently, security-increasing measures can lead to tensions, escalation or conflict with one or more other parties, producing an outcome which no party truly desires; a political instance of the prisoner's dilemma.[3][1][4][5][6]

The security dilemma is particularly intense in situations when (1) it is hard to distinguish offensive weapons from defensive weapons, and (2) offense has the advantage in any conflict over defense.[1] Military technology and geography strongly affect the offense-defense balance.[1][2]

The term was first coined by the German scholar John H. Herz in a 1950 study.[7][2] At the same time British historian Herbert Butterfield described the same situation in his History and Human Relations, but referred to it as the "absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma".[8] The security dilemma is a key concept in international relations theory, in particular among realist scholars to explain how security-seeking states can end up in conflict.[6]

  1. ^ a b c d Jervis, Robert (1978). "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma". World Politics. 30 (2): 167–214. doi:10.2307/2009958. hdl:2027/uc1.31158011478350. ISSN 0043-8871. JSTOR 2009958. S2CID 154923423.
  2. ^ a b c Glaser, Charles L. (2024-06-18). "Fear Factor". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 103, no. 4. ISSN 0015-7120.
  3. ^ Herz, John H. (1950). Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. pp. 157–180.
  4. ^ Snyder, Glenn H. (1984). "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics". World Politics. 36 (4): 461–495. doi:10.2307/2010183. ISSN 0043-8871. JSTOR 2010183. S2CID 154759602.
  5. ^ Jervis, Robert (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press. pp. 58–113. ISBN 978-0-691-10049-4.
  6. ^ a b Glaser, Charles L. (2010). Rational Theory of International Politics. Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691143729.
  7. ^ Herz, J. "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", World Politics vol. 2, no. 2 (1950): 171–201, at p. 157
  8. ^ Roe, Paul (March 1999). "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'?". Journal of Peace Research. 36 (2): 183–202. doi:10.1177/0022343399036002004. JSTOR 424669. S2CID 110838076.

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