UNSCOP (3 September 1947; see green line) and UN Ad Hoc Committee (25 November 1947) partition plans. The UN Ad Hoc Committee proposal was voted on in the resolution.
The Partition Plan, a four-part document attached to the resolution, provided for the termination of the Mandate; the gradual withdrawal of British armed forces by no later than 1 August 1948; and the delineation of boundaries between the two States and Jerusalem at least two months after the withdrawal, but no later than 1 October 1948. The Arab state was to have a territory of 11,592 square kilometres, or 42.88 percent of the Mandate's territory, and the Jewish state a territory of 15,264 square kilometres, or 56.47 percent; the remaining 0.65 percent or 176 square kilometres—comprising Jerusalem, Bethlehem and the adjoining area—would become an international zone.[5][4][6] The Plan also called for an economic union between the proposed states and for the protection of religious and minority rights.[7]
The Plan sought to address the conflicting objectives and claims of two competing movements: Palestinian nationalism and Jewish nationalism in the form of Zionism.[8][9] Jewish organizations collaborated with UNSCOP during the deliberations, while Palestinian Arab leadership boycotted it.[10] The Plan's detractors considered the proposal to be pro-Zionist, as it allocated most land to the Jewish state despite Palestinian Arabs numbering twice the Jewish population.[11][12] The Plan was celebrated by most Jews in Palestine[13] and reluctantly[14] accepted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine with misgivings.[10][15] Zionist leaders, in particular David Ben-Gurion, viewed the acceptance of the plan as a tactical step and a steppingstone to future territorial expansion over all of Palestine.[16][17][18][19][20][21]
The Arab Higher Committee, the Arab League and other Arab leaders and governments rejected the Plan, as aside from Arabs forming a two-thirds majority, they owned most of the territory.[22][23] They also indicated an unwillingness to accept any form of territorial division,[24] arguing that it violated the principles of national self-determination in the UN Charter that granted people the right to decide their own destiny.[10][25] They announced their intention to take all necessary measures to prevent the implementation of the resolution.[26][27][28][29] A civil war broke out in Palestine,[30] and the plan was not implemented.[31] In 1948, 85% of the Palestinians living in the areas that became the state of Israel became refugees.[32]
^Палестина / Л. А. Беляев, С. Б. Григорян, П. А. Рассадин (с 1939), М. Ю. Рощин // Большая российская энциклопедия : (в 35 т.) / гл. ред. Ю. С. Осипов. – М. : Большая российская энциклопедия, 2004–2017.
^Cite error: The named reference undocs.org/A/364 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^Molinaro, Enrico (1 April 2009). Holy Places of Jerusalem in Middle East Peace Agreements: The Conflict Between Global and State Identities. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. p. 78. ISBN978-1845193355.
^ abcCite error: The named reference UN was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^"BBC News". news.bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 23 October 2023.
^Ben-Dror 2007, pp. 259–7260: "The Arabs overwhelmingly rejected UNSCOP’s recommendations. The Arabs’ list of arguments against the majority’s conclusions was indeed a long one. A Palestinian historian summarized it by saying ‘Everything about it was Zionist’. When one takes into consideration the majority’s recommendations and the enthusiasm with which these recommendations were accepted by the Zionist leadership, then one can indeed affirm that claim. UNSCOP recommended an independent Jewish state, although the Arabs firmly objected to the principle of independence for the Jews, and did so in a way very generous to the Jews. More than half of the area of Palestine (62 percent) was allocated to be a Jewish state and the Arab state was supposed to make do with the remaining area, although the Palestinian Arab population numbered as much as twice the Jewish population in the land. The pro-Zionist results from UNSCOP confirmed the Arabs’ basic suspicions towards the committee. Even before the onset of its inquiry in Palestine, argued the Arabs, most of its members took a pro-Zionist stand. In addition, according to the Arabs, the committee’s final object – the partition – was pre-decided by the Americans. According to this opinion, the outcome of the UNSCOP inquiry was a foregone conclusion. This perception, which led the Palestinian Arabs to boycott the committee, is shared by some modern studies as well."
^Cite error: The named reference trove1947-11-30 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^Cite error: The named reference TEOP was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^Sean F. McMahon, The Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations, Routledge 2010 p. 40.
"The Zionist movement also accepted the UN partition plan of 1947 tactically. Palumbo notes that “[t]he Zionists accepted this scheme [the UN partition plan] since they hoped to use their state as a base to conquer the whole country.” Similarly, Flapan states that “[Zionist] acceptance of the resolution in no way diminished the belief of all the Zionist parties in their right to the whole of the country [Palestine]”; and that “acceptance of the UN Partition Resolution was an example of Zionist pragmatism par excellence. It was a tactical acceptance, a vital step in the right direction – a springboard for expansion when circumstances proved more judicious.”
^Rothrock, James (12 October 2021). Live by the Sword: Israel's Struggle for Existence in the Holy Land. Bloomington: WestBow Press. p. 14. ISBN9781449725198.
^Lenczowski, G. (1962). The Middle East in World Affairs (3rd Edition). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. p. 723
^Cite error: The named reference Britannica2002 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^Cite error: The named reference Galnoor1995 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^Pappe, Ilan (2011). The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oneworld Publications Limited. p. 213. ISBN9781780740560.