The transparency of experience, also known as the transparency thesis, is the idea in the philosophy of mind that perception is phenomenally transparent. This means that "we see right through" the intrinsic properties of experience directly to the properties of perceived objects. As a result, it is impossible for introspection to reveal the intrinsic or purely qualitative aspects of experience.
It has been used as part of the transparency argument, or argument from diaphanousness, to support intentionalism.[a] According to the argument, the fact that introspection can only access the intentional or representational aspects of experience supports the conclusion that intentionality is fundamental to the mental. This means that the phenomenal aspect of experience is reducible to or at least supervenient upon its intentional content. A result of this conclusion is that there are no purely phenomenal aspects of experience, or qualia, because all phenomenal experiences have an intentional content.
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