Richard Rorty

Richard Rorty
	Richard Rorty
Nome completo	Richard Rorty
Nascimento	4 de outubro de 1931 (93 anos); Nova Iorque
Morte	8 de junho de 2007 (75 anos); Palo Alto
Nacionalidade	Estados Unidos
Cônjuge	Amelie Oksenberg Rorty; Mary Varney Rorty (1972-?)
Filho(a)(s)	Kevin; Patricia
Ocupação	Filósofo
Principais trabalhos	[Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature]
Escola/tradição	Pragmatismo
Religião	Ateu

Richard Rorty (Nova Iorque, 4 de Outubro de 1931 - Palo Alto, 8 de Junho de 2007^[1]) foi um filósofo pragmatista estadunidense. A sua principal obra é Filosofia e o Espelho da Natureza (1979).

Rorty rejeitou a ideia de longa data de que representações internas corretas de objetos no mundo exterior são um pré-requisito necessário para o conhecimento. Rorty argumentou, em vez disso, que o conhecimento é um assunto interno e linguístico; O conhecimento diz respeito apenas à nossa própria língua.^[2]^[3] Rorty argumenta que a linguagem é composta de vocabulários que são temporários e históricos,^[4] e conclui que "uma vez que os vocabulários são feitos por seres humanos, as verdades também o são".^[5] A aceitação dos argumentos anteriores leva ao que Rorty chama de "ironismo"; um estado de espírito em que as pessoas estão completamente conscientes de que seu conhecimento depende de seu tempo e lugar na história e, portanto, estão um pouco descoladas de suas próprias crenças.^[6] No entanto, Rorty também argumenta que "uma crença ainda pode regular a ação, ainda pode ser considerada digna de morte, entre as pessoas que estão bastante conscientes de que essa crença é causada por nada mais profundo do que uma circunstância histórica contingente".^[7]

↑ Richard Rorty, 75; Leading U.S. Pragmatist Philosopher (em inglês)
↑ Robert Brandom summarizes Rorty's anti-representationalism "In a nutshell, this is how I think Rorty's critique of semantic representationalism goes: Normative relations are exclusively intravocabulary. Extravocabulary relations are exclusively causal. Representation purports to be both a normative relation, supporting assessments of correctness and incorrectness, and a relation between representings within a vocabulary and representeds outside of that vocabulary. Therefore, the representational model of the relation of vocabularies to their environment should be rejected." Brandom, Robert (11 de outubro de 2000). Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and Historicism. (In: Rorty and His Critics). Malden, Mass.: [s.n.] p. 160. ISBN 0-631-20981-6. OCLC 43109795
↑ Rorty distinguished between knowledge-that and knowledge-how; only language users can have knowledge-that (epistemically valid knowledge) while all life forms, including bacteria and virus, can have "knowledge-how" (know-how). Rorty, Richard (11 de outubro de 2000). Response to Barry Allen. (In: Rorty and His Critics). Malden, Mass.: [s.n.] pp. 238–239. ISBN 0-631-20981-6. OCLC 43109795
↑ Rorty, Richard (1982). Consequences of pragmatism: Essays, 1972-1980. Minneapolis: [s.n.] p. 158. ISBN 0-8166-1064-9. OCLC 8222790
↑ Rorty, Richard (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: [s.n.] pp. 6, 21. ISBN 0-521-35381-5. OCLC 18290785. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak. Only other human beings can do that. [...] [S]ince truth is a property of sentences, since sentences are dependent for their existence upon vocabularies, and since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are truths.
↑ "The ironist spends her time worrying about the possibility that she has been initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game. She worries that the process of socialization which turned her into a human being by giving her a language may have given her the wrong language, and so turned her into the wrong kind of human being. But she cannot give a criterion of wrongness. So, the more she is driven to articulate her situation in philosophical terms, the more she reminds herself of her rootlessness by constantly using terms like Weltanschauung, 'perspective', dialectic, conceptual framework, 'historical epoch', language game, 'redescription', 'vocabulary' and 'irony'." Rorty, Richard (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: [s.n.] p. 75. ISBN 0-521-35381-5. OCLC 18290785
↑ Rorty, Richard (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: [s.n.] p. 189. ISBN 0-521-35381-5. OCLC 18290785

[1] Richard Rorty, 75; Leading U.S. Pragmatist Philosopher (em inglês)

[2] Robert Brandom summarizes Rorty's anti-representationalism "In a nutshell, this is how I think Rorty's critique of semantic representationalism goes: Normative relations are exclusively intravocabulary. Extravocabulary relations are exclusively causal. Representation purports to be both a normative relation, supporting assessments of correctness and incorrectness, and a relation between representings within a vocabulary and representeds outside of that vocabulary. Therefore, the representational model of the relation of vocabularies to their environment should be rejected." Brandom, Robert (11 de outubro de 2000). Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and Historicism. (In: Rorty and His Critics). Malden, Mass.: [s.n.] p. 160. ISBN 0-631-20981-6. OCLC 43109795

[3] Rorty distinguished between knowledge-that and knowledge-how; only language users can have knowledge-that (epistemically valid knowledge) while all life forms, including bacteria and virus, can have "knowledge-how" (know-how). Rorty, Richard (11 de outubro de 2000). Response to Barry Allen. (In: Rorty and His Critics). Malden, Mass.: [s.n.] pp. 238–239. ISBN 0-631-20981-6. OCLC 43109795

[4] Rorty, Richard (1982). Consequences of pragmatism: Essays, 1972-1980. Minneapolis: [s.n.] p. 158. ISBN 0-8166-1064-9. OCLC 8222790

[5] Rorty, Richard (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: [s.n.] pp. 6, 21. ISBN 0-521-35381-5. OCLC 18290785. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak. Only other human beings can do that. [...] [S]ince truth is a property of sentences, since sentences are dependent for their existence upon vocabularies, and since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are truths.

[6] "The ironist spends her time worrying about the possibility that she has been initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game. She worries that the process of socialization which turned her into a human being by giving her a language may have given her the wrong language, and so turned her into the wrong kind of human being. But she cannot give a criterion of wrongness. So, the more she is driven to articulate her situation in philosophical terms, the more she reminds herself of her rootlessness by constantly using terms like Weltanschauung, 'perspective', dialectic, conceptual framework, 'historical epoch', language game, 'redescription', 'vocabulary' and 'irony'." Rorty, Richard (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: [s.n.] p. 75. ISBN 0-521-35381-5. OCLC 18290785

[7] Rorty, Richard (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: [s.n.] p. 189. ISBN 0-521-35381-5. OCLC 18290785

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